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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No, 1 
Whether the Seventh Judicial district court incorrectly denied Baldemar Miles' 
Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment by finding that the service of process 
was adequate when the failure to serve was fatal to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews questions of whether service of process was proper under the 
correction-of-error standard. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is based 
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion. If jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the person against 
whom it runs. 
Rule 4 governs service of process. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4. Whether service of 
process was proper is a jurisdictional issue. See Garcia v. Garcia, 111 P.2d 288, 290 n.4 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) ("The requirements of Rule 4 relating to the service of process 
are jurisdictional") Under the correction-of-error standard the appropriateness of the 
jurisdictional determination is a question of law upon which the Court does not defer to 
the district court. State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) 
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(citations omitted); cf. Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 n.l 1 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("Generally the district court has some discretion in ruling on a rule 60(b) 
motion. However, if the judgment is determined to be void, the court has no discretion, 
and the judgment must be set aside.'9). 
Although jurisdictional questions present issues of law, the burden of 
demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction lies on the party challenging jurisdiction. "When a 
judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a court of general 
jurisdiction the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden in on the party 
attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence." Vijil, 784 P.2d at 1133. 
Issue No. 2 
Whether the Seventh Judicial district Court erred and abused its discretion in 
awarding Appellee attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 for Appellant's attorney's 
failure to appear at a previous hearing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court, which [the court] will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion." Wells v. 
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Seventh Judicial District Court of 
Utah 
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In 2008, Appellee, Larue Miles ("Larue") filed for divorce. Appellant, Baldemar 
("Baldemar'') Miles, was never served with notice of said filing. On June 24, 2008 The 
Seventh Judicial District Court ("district court") signed a Restraining Order & Temporary 
Order of Support. On July 11, 2008, the Larue Miles received notice of a failure of 
service of process. On July 28, 2008, Larue filed a Motion to Allow Service of Process 
of Process by Alternative Means, and district court issued an order allowing alternative 
service of process on August 1, 2008. 
On August 1, 2008 Larue sent notice via certified mail to the four addresses 
approved in order allowing alternative service of process. The mail was returned to 
Larue on September 17, 2008 as undeliverable. On September 17, 2008, Larue filed an 
Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening 90-day Waiting Period for an Entry of Divorce. 
On October, 15, 2010, the district court entered the Decree of Divorce. On 
November 4, 2008 The Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) was entered. On 
February 17, 2009 Baldemar filed a motion to set aside the judgment and the final order 
of the district court denying the motion was entered on September 22, 2009. This appeal 
is from the final order of the district court in which the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce was denied. The notice of appeal was filed on or about 
October 21, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 21, 1993 Larue and Baldemar were married in Provo, Utah. Aff. Of 
Resp. para. 1 Jan, 12, 2008. In 2008, Larue filed for divorce. Ver. Pet. for Divorc. June 
24, 2008. Baldemar was never served with notice of the said filing. Aff. Of Resp. p 2, 
6 
Ifll, Jan 13, 2009. They had been married for approximately fifteen years when they 
decided to separate. On June 12, 2008, the day of their separation they were involved in 
a domestic dispute in which the police were called to assist. After this altercation 
Baldemar moved to Florida. 
Moving swiftly, on June 18, 2008, Larue performed a nationwide person locator in 
order to discover the location of Baldemar. The search provided four different addresses 
for Baldemar, including two different addresses in Florida. Larue never informed 
Baldemar's parents that she was intending to file for divorce or asked if they knew of a 
way to get in touch with him. Aff. of Resp.'s Mother Mary W. Miles, p. 1, [^4, Jan 13, 
2009. 
Larue argues that she was never able to locate Baldemar or to find his proper 
address before the decree of divorce was entered. On August 11, Larue was able to 
change the address on Baldemar's retirement account to the address in Florida where he 
was living. Aff. of Resp. p. 3, ^14, & attached as Exhibit D, Jan 12, 2009. No court 
documents were ever sent to this address. Additionally, on September 10, 2008, Larue 
hand wrote Baldemar's proper address on a dental bill, requesting that the dental bill be 
forwarded to the address where he was living. This was not an address listed on the 
nationwide person locator. Aff. of Resp. p 3, *f 13, & attached as Exhibit C, Jan 12, 2009. 
On August 14, 2009 the district court held oral arguments on the issue of setting 
aside the default decree and the adequacy of the service of process When the court 
questioned the Appellee about sending the dental bill and the changing the retirement 
account to the Baldemar's proper address the Appellee stated that they learned of the 
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proper address from the retirement administrators after the Court entered the order and 
allowed for the QDRO. Trans. Mot. To Set Aside the Judg. Aug 14, 2010, pg 10, In 9-11. 
The QDRO was not entered by the district court until November 4, 2008, nearly three 
months after Larue discovered Baldemar's address. 
When Larue filed the Motion Requesting the Shortening of time, she was aware of 
his proper address and failed to send him any notice. The Order authorizing the 
shortening of time was entered on September 17, 2010. She forwarded the dental bill on 
September 10,2010. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The failure to properly serve notice to the Appellant violated his constitutional due 
process rights and as a result the district court did not have jurisdiction over Baldemar 
Miles when the default judgment was entered. "For a court to acquire jurisdiction, there 
must be a proper issuance and service of summons," to preserve the individual's 
constitutional right to due process. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 100 P.3d 1211, 1214 
(Utah 2004); see also, Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Utah 
1998); Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971). According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, when there is defective service, a court will not have jurisdiction over the 
case to enter a decree of divorce; and judgments entered without jurisdiction are void and 
"fatally defective." Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290-91 (Utah 1986) 
She violated the Appellant's due process rights when she continued to send 
court documents to the improper addresses after discovering his proper address. At a 
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minimum the Ex Parte Order Shortening Time, the Decree of Divorce, and the QDRO, 
and all documents relating to those items should have been sent to the Appellant as all of 
those were filed with the court after the Appellee discovered his location. Instead, they 
continued to send the documents to the improper address. And as a result, the Appellant 
did not even discover that he was divorced until the period to the appeal the decision had 
passed. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1: Whether the Seventh Judicial district court incorrectly denied Baldemar 
Miles' Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment by holding that the district court 
properly granted alternative service based upon the affidavit and record before it. 
A, THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY SERVE NOTICE TO THE 
APPELLANT VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS. 
The district court did not have jurisdiction over Baldemar Miles when the default 
judgment was entered because service of process was not proper. For a court to acquire 
jurisdiction, there must be a proper issuance and service of summons. Murdoch v. Blake, 
26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971). The requirement ensures that an 
individual will not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. "An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
9 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 
Mullane v. Cent Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 
652 (1950); see also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987) ("Service of 
process implements the procedural due process requirement that a defendant be informed 
of pending legal action and be provided with an opportunity to defend against the 
action."). According to the Utah Supreme Court, when there is defective service, a court 
will not have jurisdiction over the case to enter a decree of divorce; and judgments 
entered without jurisdiction are void and "fatally defective." Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 
288, 290-91 (Utah 1986). 
In Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over a divorce decree when the service was delivered to a prison guard rather 
than the inmate. Id. at 290. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d), which governs service of process 
expressly required delivery to a person living within the home; however the Prison guard 
worked rather than resided within the prison and at the time there was no statutory 
carveout to permit delivery in this manner. Id at 291 Alternative service of process in 
Utah is proper if "reasonable diligence" is used in attempting to locate the petitioner. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 4(d)(4)(A). At a minimum, the Appellee was required to begin 
sending court documents to the Appellant at his proper address as soon as she learned of 
it. 
Likewise, the Appellee's service of summons was equally defective. The service 
in Garcia was ruled void for imprecise delivery. Here the Appellee's service was even 
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more defective. The Appellant never received any form of notice, despite the Appellee's 
awareness of his current address. In the late summer and fall of 2009 the Appellant was 
living at 68 Elizabeth Street, Crawfordville, FL 32327. The Appellee was aware that this 
was his address. On August 11, 2009 the address on his retirement account was changed 
to the 68 Elizabeth Street address. The Appellee was the only person that had the 
information required in order to make this change. In addition, she hand wrote a 
forwarding address on a dental bill which she sent to him at the 68 Elizabeth Street 
address, dated September 10th. 
In denying the Motion to Set Aside the Decree, the district court relied on a 
statement by the Appellee that they discovered the proper address after the QDRO. This 
statement was false. The QDRO was entered on November 4, 2008. nearly two months 
after the Appellee forwarded a dental bill to the Appellant. At least three different court 
proceedings occurred after the Appellee learned of the Appellant's current address, 
including the Decree of Divorce. None of the documents relating to those proceedings 
were sent to the proper address. Instead the Appellee continued to send them to an 
address where she knew they would be returned as undeliverable. 
B. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT APPELLEE EXERCISE 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE AND 
SERVE A DEFENDANT. 
In Utah, rule 4 of the Utah R. of Civ. Proc. Governs service of process. With 
respect to service by alternative means the rule provides: 
l i 
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served 
are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable 
diligence, where service upon all of the individual parties is 
impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists 
good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding 
service of process, the party seeking service of process may 
file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order 
allowing service by publication or by some other means. The 
supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to 
identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the 
individual parties. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 4(d)(4)(A). 
The requirement that the plaintiff submit an affidavit with the appropriate 
averments has been called the "diligence requirement." See Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1269, 1277 (Utah 1987). Because the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution requires that ua plaintiff must act diligently and take such steps in attempting 
to give the defendant actual notice of the proceeding as are reasonably practicable,'" id. at 
1275. It follows that if a plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to believe 
that he or she has exercised such diligence when he or she has not done so, the court, 
although at the time appearing to have jurisdiction, never had jurisdiction because the 
plaintiff never met the constitutional mandate. 
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In a case involving a statutory precursor to Rule 4(d), the supreme court of Utah 
set aside a default judgment against a defendant when the plaintiff filed an affidavit, 
which falsely averred that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the defendant's address or 
location. Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P. 215, 219 (Utah 1912). The court 
held that, although the statement in the affidavit may have been technically true, the 
affiant falsely averred because uhe had ready and convenient means of knowledge'" but 
failed to either disclose the means or discover the information he claimed he did not 
know. Id. Hence, the court found that a technically correct but intentionally misleading 
statement in the affidavit was false. Id. 
To satisfy the diligence requirement the appellee needed to establish that a diligent 
attempt was made to obtain the appellant's current address. Here, the procedure used by 
the Appellee fell short of the reasonable diligence standard which resulted in a violation 
of the appellant's Constitutional due process rights. Even if they did not know his current 
address when they filed the motion for alternative service of process, the Appellee still 
had a duty to begin sending service to the current address as soon as they learned of the 
current address. The failure to send service to his proper after discovering it was fatal. 
The district court did not have jurisdiction over the appellant at the time the divorce 
decree was entered because the information was not sent to the Appellant's current 
address, despite the fact that the Appellee knew of that address at that time. 
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C. THE APPELLEE'S AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING ALTERNATIVE 
SERVICE OF PROCESS FELL SHORT OF THE REASONABLE 
DILIGENCE STANDARD. 
Even assuming that the affidavit was not false, the trial court erred when it decided 
that the plaintiff had met the due diligence requirement. The trial court should have 
known at the time of the motion for alternative service that Larue Miles had not exercised 
due diligence. The affidavit used by the appellee to support the application for 
alternative process on its face does not show sufficient diligence in investigating. The 
effort that one must exercise to satisfy the due diligence requirement has been clearly 
explained. 
The reasonable diligence standard does not require a plaintiff to "exhaust all 
possibilities" to locate and serve a defendant. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blankeney 
Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976), overruled in part on other grounds by Mgmt 
Servs. v. Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). It does however, require more than 
perfunctory performance. uWhen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere 
gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually 
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 
315. 
Quoting Justice Wolfe's concurrence in Parker, the court in Jackson Construction 
adopted the following definition of reasonable diligence: ''[Reasonable diligence] is that 
diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably 
calculated to do so. If the end sought is the address of an out-of-state defendant it 
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encompasses those steps most likely, under the circumstances, to accomplish that result. 
quoting, 217 P.2d at 379 (Wolfe, J., concurring). The court articulated the standard 
further stating, "[t]o meet the reasonable diligence requirement, plaintiff who focuses on 
only one or two sources, while turning a blind eye to the existence of other available 
sources, falls short of this standard. Id. at P20. 
In finding that Jackson Construction failed to demonstrate that it made reasonably 
diligent attempts to notify Douglas and Robert of its suit, the court suggested that in cases 
involving out-of-state defendants, "a plaintiff might attempt to locate the defendants by 
checking telephone directories and public records, contacting former neighbors, or 
engaging in other actions suggested by the particular circumstances of the case." Id. In 
this instance, it would have been simple, inexpensive, and likely to produce a current 
address if the appellee had questioned the appellant 's parents if they knew of a way to 
contact the appellant. This simple step was ignored. In addition, the Appellee's ability to 
change the Appellant's address on retirement accounts only eleven (11) days after the 
affidavit demonstrates the feasibility of locating the appellant. 
At a minimum the reasonable diligence standard required that the Appellee begin 
to send court documents to the Appellant as soon as she learned of his location. Instead, 
she forwarded bills and demands for payment to his proper location, emd court documents 
to the incorrect address. At least three different court proceedings occurred, including the 
Decree of Divorce, after the Appellee learned of the Appellant's proper address. None of 
the documents relating to those proceedings were sent to the proper address. Instead the 
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Appellee continued to send them to an address where she knew they would be returned as 
undeliverable. 
D. THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY 
DENIED BALDEMAR MILES' RULE 60(B) MOTION TO VACATE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY HOLDING THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURT PROPERLY GRANTED ALTERNATIVE SERVICE BASED 
UPON THE AFFIDAVIT AND RECORD BEFORE IT. 
On the Rule 60(b) motion, the district court below apparently concluded that the 
Appellee had exercised due diligence because it had contacted all of the addresses 
discovered after performing a nationwide person locator search. Due diligence requires 
more than attempting to contact addresses from one source. Due diligence is not 
' 'diligence which stops just short of the place where if it were continued might reasonably 
be expected to uncover an address...of the person on whom service is sought," and "must 
be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case." Parker v. Ross, 111 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 
373, 379 (Utah 1950) (Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
In this case, when attempting to serve process at the incorrect address the appellee 
was informed by the resident of the address that the appellant's girlfriend had lived there 
once, but no longer did. Aff. In Support of Mot. To Allow Service of Proc. By Alt. 
Means. *f 8. Nowhere in the affidavit does it state that the appellee asked the appellant's 
parents if they had a current address or an ability to get in touch with the appellant 
despite having an open and cordial line of communication with the appellant's mother. 
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The fact that the appellee was able to change the address on a retirement account 
to the proper address just eleven (11) days after filing the affidavit in support of 
alternative service further demonstrates the feasibility of the appellee to determine the 
proper address when diligence is used. Even under a broad interpretation of 
reasonableness the Appellee's affidavit falls short of the reasonable diligence standard 
required by the precedent of this state. 
In denying the Motion to Set Aside the Decree, the district court relied on a 
statement by the Appellee that they discovered the proper address after the QDRO. This 
statement was false. The QDRO was entered on November 4, 2008, nearly two months 
after the Appellee forwarded a dental bill to the Appellant. 
ISSUE 2: Whether the Seventh Judicial district Court erred and abused its discretion in 
awarding Appellee attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 for Appellant's attorney's 
failure to appear at a previous hearing. 
A hearing was scheduled to be held to address the Appellant 's motion to set aside 
the default judgment on July 27, 2009, however, the Appellant's attorney's car broke 
down on the way to Emery County. He immediately contacted the court to let know what 
had happened. The hearing was then and there rescheduled for August 14, 2009. At the 
rescheduled hearing the judge awarded the Appellee $1,000.00 in attorneys' fees for his 
failure to appear at the previous hearing, despite the extraordinary circumstances 
surrounding his reason for not appearing, and despite the fact that the Appellee has not 
even motioned for said fees. 
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"An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court, which [the court] will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion." Wells v. 
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). See also, Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
App 236, P30, 9 P.3d 171. Still, in awarding attorney fees, the trial court must consider 
"the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees." Kelley, 9 P.3d at 171 (quotations and citations 
omitted). The district court judge, in awarding the attorney fees, failed to consider any 
factors regarding the receiving spouse's financial need or the payor spouse's ability to 
pay, or the reasonableness of the requested fees. In this instance, the fees were not even 
requested. There was no motion for attorneys' fees. In light of the extraordinary 
circumstances surrounding the failure to attend the hearing, the immediate notice to the 
court of the automobile problems, and the lack of a motion or request for attorneys' fees, 
the award of attorneys' fees was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not have jurisdiction over the Appellant when the divorce 
decree was entered. The Appellee knew of his actual address but continued to send 
notice and all court documents to an address where they knew that the mail would be 
returned as undeliverable. The Appellee forwarded bills and financial notices to the 
Appellant's actual address and sent court documents to an improper address. This 
violated his due process rights and took away his opportunity to attend the divorce 
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hearing, resulting in a one-sided divorce decree. In addition, this failure of service of 
process took away his opportunity to appeal the divorce decree. The failure of the service 
of process was fatal and as a result the district court did not have jurisdiction over the 
Appellant. 
Therefore, the divorce decree should be set aside because the district court did not 
have jurisdiction over the Appellee when the decree was entered. 
Dated this _ ] day of May, 2011 
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